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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of 
adjustments to Wasatch's financial statements to prove Roger Eggett's claim for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
Standard of Review: Whether parol evidence is admissible to prove a claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law is reviewed for correction 
of error; whether particular evidence was properly admitted is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 
P.2d 445, 455 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Preservation of Issue: Wasatch objected to the admission of the evidence to vary the 
unambiguous contractual terms, as a violation of the parol evidence rule. (Trial Transcript, 
hereinafter "Tr./' 256-57, 264), as well by motion for directed verdict (Tr. 908-09), pretrial 
motion in limine (Tr. 1 -8), and pretrial motion to compel discovery (Record, hereinafter "R.," 
141,165-68). 
Wasatch's brief makes no mention of Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant, and 
does not challenge the admission or admissibility of the evidence to prove the breach of 
covenant claim. Accordingly, Wasatch's appeal that admission violated the parol evidence 
rule is moot. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion under Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) in 
clarifying the jury's intention and verdict that $135,671.96 was the book value of Roger 
Eggett's shares, and the amount to be awarded to Eggett for his shares? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1963). See also, discussion and authorities at 29, infra, & n. 6. Wasatch wrongly asserts 
that the standard of review is correction of error, citing Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. 
Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1995). Bennion, however, is an appeal of a denial of a motion for 
a new trial under Rule 59(a). It makes no mention of Rule 47(r), and no mention of the 
standard of review under either Rule 59(a) or 47(r). 
Preservation of Issue. Wasatch objected to the trial Court's authority to clarify the 
jury's intention and verdict. (Tr. 990, 994). Wasatch never objected to the form of the 
questions asked, and has waived its objections to the form of the questions. 
3. Whether the trial Court abused its discretion in awarding costs and attorney's 
fees to Roger Eggett as the prevailing party? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988); Schafirv. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue: Wasatch objected to the propriety of the fees by post trial 
motion. (R. 331). Wasatch never objected to the adequacy of the trial Court's findings, or 
to the form of Supplemental Judgment. Indeed, Wasatch approved the Supplemental 
Judgment as to form. (Appellant's Brief Addendum, hereinafter "App. Br" or "App. Br. 
Add.," at 6.) Wasatch has waived its appeal based upon the adequacy of the trial Court's 
findings. 
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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Plaintiff/Appellee Roger Eggett agrees with the Statement of Determinative Legal 
Provisions by Defendant/Appellant Wasatch Energy Corp. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellee Roger Eggett ("Eggett") is the founder and former president of 
Defendant/Appellant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"), and the former chairman of its 
Board of Directors. In April 1997, Eggett resigned as president and board chairman. At that 
time, Eggett was the largest shareholder, owning 36.5% of Wasatch's shares. (Tr. 256.) 
Eggett's resignation as board chairman was effective immediately; his resignation as 
president was to be effective after 90 days, pursuant to his Employment Agreement In May 
1997, Wasatch purported to terminate Eggett for cause. Based on the purported termination, 
Wasatch asserted that a Shareholders' Agreement entitled Wasatch to purchase Eggett's 
shares for par value ($1,216.70, or 50 per share) rather than book value. (App. Br. Add 36.) 
Eggett brought this action, alleging three claims for relief. (R. 1-7.) The first claim 
alleged that Wasatch breached his Employment Agreement by refusing to pay Eggett 
compensation he was owed from January 1,1997 through his resignation. The second claim 
alleged that Wasatch breached his Shareholders' Agreement by refusing to pay Eggett book 
value for his shares. The third claim alleged that Wasatch breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inherent in the Employment Agreement and Shareholders' Agreement. 
Wasatch asserted counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and breach of 
contract, alleging that Eggett took excessive compensation between 1995 and his resignation, 
and abused his expense account. (R. 17-26.) 
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The jury found for Eggett on all his claims and against Wasatch on all its 
counterclaims. The jury awarded Eggett $11,188 in additional compensation, which was 
equal to the remaining compensation to be paid for March and April, 1997 ($9,634 + $2,254 
= $11,188). The jury also awarded Eggett $135,671.96 as book value for his shares, which 
was equal to Wasatch's audited book value ($75,452), with an adjustment for suspense 
account items ($296,252), multiplied by Eggett's ownership percentage ($75,452 + $296,252 
x 36.5% - $135,671.96). (App. Br. Add 7-10.) 
Upon reading the Special Verdict Form, the trial Court clarified the jury's intention 
and verdict that $135,671.35 was the book value of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be 
awarded to Eggett, not the book value of all Wasatch shares. The trial Court questioned the 
jury foreman twice, and then questioned all jurors. The jurors answered unanimously and 
decisively that $135,671.96 was the amount to be paid to Eggett for his shares. The trial 
Court then entered the verdict and discharged the jury. (Tr. 988-95.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wasatch makes no attempt to marshal the facts supporting the jury verdict. Instead, 
Wasatch presents a highly distorted selection of facts and exhibits (e.g., the Goodfellow 
report, App. Br. Add. 37-45) to make the same arguments that the jury rejected. On appeal, 
of course, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. See, e^, Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 977 P.2d 508, 510 (Utah 
App. 1999); E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 
1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). Those facts and inferences include: 
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Eggett's Founding of Wasatch and the Relevant 
Provisions of the Shareholders' Agreement 
Eggett founded Wasatch in the basement of his home in 1993, to market natural gas 
between small producers and suppliers. (Tr. 107-08.) Magna Energy Corp.("Magna") 
became an investor in Wasatch in April 1995. (Tr. 122.) At that time, Eggett and two other 
Wasatch shareholders and employees (Tod Cusick and Curtis Chisholm) entered separate 
Employment Agreements with Wasatch, and entered a joint Shareholders' Agreement (App. 
Br. Add. 21-30.) 
In relevant part for this appeal, Paragraph 2 of the Shareholders' Agreement provided 
that, upon the withdrawal of a shareholder from the corporation, the remaining shareholders 
and then Wasatch would have the right and option to purchase the withdrawing shareholder's 
shares. (App. Br. Add. 21.) Paragraph 3 of the Shareholders' agreement specified that a 
shareholder who resigned would be paid book value for his shares; a shareholder who was 
terminated for cause would be paid the lesser of book value or the price paid by the 
shareholder for his shares. Id. Paragraph 18(c) specified the grounds for which Wasatch 
could terminate an employee for cause.1 Paragraph 18(d) defined book value as "the 
consolidated net shareholders' equity" as "certified to by the firm of independent public 
accountants then regularly employed by" Wasatch. Paragraph 18(d) also specified that the 
!In summary, paragraph 18(c) specified that an employee could be terminated for (i) 
a felony conviction or crime of moral turpitude); (ii) fraud with respect to the corporation or 
theft of its assets; (iii) any material breach of the employee's obligations; (iv) repeated 
neglect, malfeasance, or nonfeasance detrimental to the best interests of the corporation; or 
(v) a substance abuse problem. (App. Br. Add. 27-28.) 
5 
determination of book value "shall be made on an accrual basis in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties." 
Formation of the Compensation Committee and 
Determination of Eggett's Compensation for 1996 and 1997 
In late 1995, Wasatch formed a Compensation Committee to set Eggett's 
compensation, because he did not want Wasatch's employees on the Board of Directors to 
set his compensation or know what it was. The Committee consisted of Eggett and Magna's 
two representatives on Wasatch's Board of Directors. (Tr. 170-71.) For 1996, the 
Committee agreed to establish guidelines that gave Eggett discretion to set compensation for 
all employees, so long as certain amounts of income were committed to retained earnings. 
(Tr. 173-76.) Eggett committed substantially more money to retained earnings than the 
guidelines required, and was commended by Magna's representative on the Compensation 
Committee for taking less income than he could have. (Tr. 186-97, 220-23, 403-04.) 
In late 1996 and early 1997, Eggett negotiated his 1997 compensation with Keith 
Painter ("Painter*'), Magna's principal representative on the Compensation Committee. They 
agreed that Eggett would receive a base salary of $84,000, plus 10% of the net income before 
taxes. The Agreement was reflected in memos (Tr. 215-18), and confirmed by Painter at 
Wasatch's Board of Directors meeting on March 21,1997, which was recorded on audio tape 
and played to the jury at trial. Painter said to Eggett, "you and I are pretty much together on 
your compensation, aren't we?" (Tr. 233, 237). 
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Eggett's Resignation 
Due to disputes with Magna over the management of Wasatch, Eggett submitted a 
letter of resignation dated April 15, 1997. Pursuant to his Employment Agreement, Eggett 
gave 90 days notice of his resignation as president, and informed Wasatch that his last day 
of employment would be July 15, 1997. (Tr. 125-30, 132-34.) At a Board meeting on April 
16, 1997, Wasatch accepted Eggett's resignation, and approved a motion to offer Eggett the 
"position of consultant, and negotiate terms with him should he accept this position." (Tr. 
444.) By correspondence dated April 25,1997, Wasatch informed Eggett that "information 
regarding the status of your employment with Wasatch will be forthcoming." (App. Br. Add. 
32.) Eggett then retained counsel, who requested by correspondence dated April 29, 1997, 
that Wasatch pay the compensation owed to Eggett pursuant to his agreement with the 
Compensation Committee. (Tr. 145.) 
Wasatch's Bad Faith Termination of Eggett for Cause 
From the moment Eggett retained counsel to protect his interests, Wasatch acted in 
bad faith to avoid honoring its agreement to pay Eggett's compensation, and to avoid 
honoring its agreement to pay Eggett book value for his shares. By correspondence dated 
May 16, 1997, Wasatch notified Eggett that he had been terminated for cause. (App. Br. 
Add. 33-34.) The Board of Directors never gave Eggett an opportunity to be heard before 
terminating him. (Tr. 435-37.) The purported grounds in large part tracked the report of an 
accountant who reviewed Wasatch's books and records; the report concluded that Eggett 
took excessive compensation and abused his expense account. (App. Br. Add. 37-45.) The 
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accountant never spoke to Eggett about his compensation or about the expense account; the 
accountant was never even told that Eggett's compensation was set by a Compensation 
Committee, because the report makes no reference to the Committee. Id, Two months later, 
Wasatch implicitly admitted that the termination was specious, because Wasatch provided 
a representation letter to its auditors stating that there had been no irregularities involving 
management during the fiscal year. (Tr. 672-75.) 
The evidence at trial proved that the grounds for termination were manufactured in 
bad faith, to deprive Eggett of his compensation and book value for his shares. Wasatch 
terminated Eggett for soliciting employee David Lillywhite to leave Wasatch, but the 
evidence proved that Eggett did not solicit Lillywhite to leave, and had no interest in 
Lillywhite's competing business. (Tr. 152-56.) 
Wasatch terminated Eggett for fraud and theft in taking unauthorized compensation, 
but the evidence proved that Eggett's compensation was agreed to by the Compensation 
Committee, and that Eggett took less than he could have taken under the agreement. See, 
supra, at 6 - 7. Wasatch terminated Eggett for refusing to disclose compensation figures to 
the Board of Directors, but the evidence proved that Eggett provided the figures the only time 
that a director requested them. (Tr. 212.) The audio tape of the March 21, 1997, Board 
meeting also proved that Eggett offered to disclose all compensation figures, but the directors 
said that they did not want to know. (Tr. 238-40.) 
Wasatch terminated Eggett for abusing his expense account. For example, Wasatch 
accused Eggett of improperly directing Wasatch to make his car payments, even though 
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Painter had approved the request three months earlier and thought that it was "no problem." 
(Tr. 224-25,417-18.) Wasatch terminated Eggett for making a charitable contribution to the 
Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, even though Wasatch had made contributions to charities 
supported by Magna. (Tr. 159-62.) 
Finally, Wasatch terminated Eggett for disruptive comments when Eggett announced 
his resignation to employees on April 15,1997, even though the Board did not consider these 
alleged comments worthy of termination at Board meetings on April 16, 18, and 29, when 
Wasatch determined to retain Eggett as a consultant. (Tr. 443-50.) 
Wasatch's Bad Faith Manipulation of the 
Financial Statements to Reduce Book Value 
In late 1996 and early 1997, Wasatch grew tremendously, faster than anyone 
expected. (Tr. 125.) January through March 1997 were the most profitable months ever; 
Wasatch made more than half a million dollars in January alone. (Tr. 249, 258, 770-75.) 
After Wasatch terminated Eggett for cause, Wasatch management prepared the year-
end financial statements for audit. In so doing, management made a series of adjustments 
to the monthly financial statements that reduced Wasatch's income and audited book value 
by hundreds of thousands of dollars. Wasatch made no adjustments that increased its stated 
book value, even though Wasatch had every incentive to increase book value to show a 
stronger financial position to its bankers and business partners. (Tr. 575-76, 663-64.) 
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Because the adjustments were contrary to Wasatch's incentive, Wasatch's only motive was 
to deny Eggett book value for his shares.2 (R. 679.) These adjustments included: 
Suspense Account Entries. When Eggett was president, Wasatch maintained a 
suspense account, which included income actually received from certain customers where 
there was a question or possible dispute about the amount. Wasatch held the income in the 
suspense account for one year, to avoid treating it as earned income and paying bonuses or 
profit sharing on it. At the end of each fiscal year, as Eggett prepared the financial 
statements for audit, Eggett transferred entries that were more than a year old from the 
suspense account to retained earnings. (Tr. 272-74.) 
After Eggett was terminated, Wasatch management extended the suspense account 
period from one to two years. (Tr. 274). Wasatch's auditors had no role in the decision; they 
were just told about it. Wasatch told its auditors that it lengthened the suspense period to be 
more consistent with industry practice and with its new contracts, but Wasatch's contracts 
were short term and did not justify the change. (Tr., 274-77, 6767-78, 681.) 
As a result of the adjustment, Wasatch transferred no income from the suspense 
account to retained earnings for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1997. If Wasatch had 
followed its prior practice under Eggett, and applied a one-year period, its auditors would 
2Ward Coombs, the Ernst & Young accountant with primary responsibility for 
auditing Wasatch's financial statements, testified that management prepares the financial 
statements; the auditor expresses an opinion on their fairness, but does not prepare them. 
Coombs also testified that the auditor relies on the representations of management, and that 
management could mislead the auditor if it wanted to. If management had a different reason 
for doing something, the auditor would not know that. Wasatch could have made 
adjustments solely to deprive Eggett of book value for his shares, and the auditor would 
know a thing about it. (R. 671-72.) 
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have shifted $296,252 of income to retained earnings, and would have included it in the 
calculation of book value. (Tr. 276-77, 682.) 
Grynberg Adjustment. Wasatch kept in the suspense account an additional $45,553 
because of a temporary dispute about amounts owed on the Grynberg contract. The dispute 
lasted only a few days or weeks. Grynberg honored the contract in December 1996, and paid 
the agreed-upon amounts in fiscal year 1997. Before Eggett's termination, the $45,553 
would have been transferred from the suspense account to retained earnings. (Tr. 279-80.) 
Swap Contract Adjustment. As a buyer and seller of natural gas, Wasatch entered 
"offsetting" or "swap" supply contracts, which protected Wasatch against abrupt changes in 
the price of natural gas. In early 1997, Wasatch negotiated two offsetting contracts, but one 
was never executed, creating possible exposure on the executed contract. In preparing the 
year-end financial statements after Eggett's termination, Wasatch held in reserve $283,000 
in income earned that year to cover any exposure on the executed contract, and the auditors 
did not include it in the calculation of book value. As of the end of the fiscal year, however, 
the executed contract had not begun. It began in July 1997, and made money until October. 
(Tr. 296.) At that time, Wasatch executed a new "offsetting" contract, that covered the losses 
on the original contract, and protected Wasatch from losing money. (Tr. 268-71, 384-88; 
513.)3 
3As further evidence of Wasatch's bad faith, Wasatch produced documents that 
purportedly showed a loss of $489,000 on the executed contract. Wasatch never provided 
information relating to the offsetting contract that canceled that loss. (Tr. 296, 373). 
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Eggett's Testimony at Trial. At trial, Eggett calculated the book value of his shares 
by restoring the adjustments made by Wasatch management in bad faith to deprive him of 
book value. These were the same adjustments that Eggett would have made as president in 
preparing the year-end financial statements for audit. (Tr. 299, 889.) In his initial testimony, 
Eggett made another adjustment relating to the United Utilities lawsuit. Eggett withdrew the 
adjustment in rebuttal, because the auditor testified that he, not Wasatch management, made 
that adjustment. Wasatch management, however, made all other adjustments. (Tr. 890-92.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Wasatch appeals the admission of evidence of the accounting adjustments 
on the wrong ground. Wasatch argues that the trial Court improperly admitted the evidence 
to vary the definition of "Book Value" in the Shareholders' Agreement, in violation of the 
parol evidence rule and other rules of contractual interpretation. The evidence, however, was 
neither offered nor admitted for that purpose. The evidence was admitted on Eggett's claim 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing - to prove that Wasatch made 
adjustments to the financial statements in bad faith to deprive Eggett of book value for his 
shares, and to prove the true book value of Eggett's shares if Wasatch had not acted in bad 
faith. 
Because evidence must be admitted if it is admissible for one purpose but not another, 
Wasatch's appeal is moot. Wasatch never mentions Eggett's breach of covenant claim, or 
appeals the admission of the evidence on that claim. In any event, a long line of decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court has held that parol evidence is admissible to prove 
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a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even if it is not admissible 
to modify the express terms of a contract. 
Point II. The trial Court acted well within its discretion in questioning the jurors to 
clarify their intention and verdict. By questioning the jury foreman twice, and then 
questioning all jurors to confirm the foreman's answers, the Court determined that 
$135,671.96 was the book value of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be awarded to Eggett 
for his shares, not the book value of all Wasatch shares. Wasatch's assertion that the trial 
Court "coerced" the jury to accept the Court's "view" of the evidence is preposterous. The 
trial Court never stated to the jury any "view"of the evidence, remained neutral in its 
questions, and told the jurors that the Court wanted to know if they disagreed with the 
foreman's answers. 
The trial Court had ample discretion and authority to question the jurors to correct a 
possible informal or insufficient verdict, pursuant to U. R. Civ. P. 47(r), and Jorgensen v. 
Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963). By no stretch of the imagination were the trial Court's 
questions arbitrary and capricious or otherwise an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Wasatch 
objected to the trial Court's authority to correct the verdict, but did not object to the form of 
the questions or seek clarification at trial of the jurors' answers. Wasatch therefore has 
waived its objection to the form of the trial court's questions. 
Finally, any error in the Court's questions is harmless. It is indisputable that the jury 
calculated $135,671.96 as the book value of Eggett's shares. The jury foreman twice stated 
that it was the amount to be "paid for the shares," and the jurors confirmed his answers. The 
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jury clearly calculated the book value of Eggett's shares, because 5135,671.96 equals the 
audited book value of Wasatch (575,452), adjusted by the suspense account items 
(5296,252), and multiplied by Eggett's ownership percentage (36.5%). 
Point III. The trial Court acted well within its discretion in awarding Eggett 
560,374.43 in costs and attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Eggett was awarded fees on 
his claim for breach of the Shareholders' Agreement (which had an attorney's fee provision), 
but not for breach of his Employment Agreement (which did not have such a provision). The 
trial Court found that Eggett made a proper segregation of fees incurred before May 16, 
1997, which related solely to Eggett's claims for breach of the Employment Agreement. The 
trial Court also found that the claims for breach of the Shareholder Agreement were the 
predominant claims at trial, that they were intertwined with Eggett's claims for breach of the 
Employment Agreement and with Wasatch's counterclaims, and that it was not possible to 
distinguish them. The trial Court awarded Eggett costs and fees on all claims incurred after 
May 16, 1997, with the exception of certain fees that Eggett redacted from his request. 
Numerous decisions by this Court authorize the trial Court to award "all attorney fees 
reasonably incurred in the litigation" when a "plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a 
common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least some it its claims." 
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah App.1999). Further, Wasatch 
has waived its objection to the adequacy of the trial Court's findings, because it approved the 
Supplemental Judgment as to form and made no objection to the findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ADJUSTMENTS TO BOOK VALUE WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED 
ON EGGETT'S CLAIM THAT WASATCH BREACHED THE COVENANT 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
A. Wasatch's Appeal Is Moot, Because Wasatch Does Not Dispute That the 
Evidence Was Admissible to Prove That Wasatch Acted in Bad Faith, In 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Wasatch argues that the trial Court erred in admitting evidence of the adjustments to 
audited book value, because the Shareholders' Agreement stated that book value would be 
based "on audited financial statements," and would be "binding and conclusive on the 
parties." Wasatch argues that the Court violated the parol evidence rule, and allowed Eggett 
to vary the plain meaning of the unambiguous contractual terms. (App. Br. at 13-15,20-21.) 
Wasatch misses the point. At trial, Eggett never contended that the Shareholders' 
Agreement was ambiguous, and did not offer the adjustments as evidence of the meaning of 
the Agreement or the intention of the parties. Eggett offered the evidence to prove that 
Wasatch breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in manipulating the year-end 
financial statements to deprive him of book value. 
Wasatch's brief does not make a single mention of Eggett's claim for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It was, however, the Third Claim for Relief in the 
Complaint. (R. 6.) Undersigned counsel presented the claim in opening, and the trial Court 
instructed the jury about the claim. (Tr. 69-70,79,921 -22.) Undersigned counsel argued the 
claim in closing: 
The third claim we have is for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
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dealing. As you've just heard the judge instruct you, the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is a covenant that adheres in every contract. And what 
it says is that each party will treat the others honestly and fairly. We claim that 
Wasatch did not treat Mr. Eggett fairly and honestly in terminating him or in 
refusing to pay his compensation. We claim that they acted in bad faith and 
I'm going to describe the facts to you in a moment that prove that bad faith. 
(Tr. 938.) Undersigned counsel later told the jury that Wasatch management made the 
adjustments to the accounting statements in bad faith to deprive Eggett of book value: 
All these [adjustments] were made by management. As Mr. Stevens told you, 
management had an incentive to inflate its income, to look (inaudible) 
financial statements. The only reason to make these adjustments if you're 
management in the face of that incentive, is to deny Mr. Eggett book value for 
[his] shares. 
(Tr. 975.) 
The trial Court admitted evidence of the adjustments because they squarely related to 
Eggett's breach of covenant claim. As the trial Court held in denying Wasatch's motion for 
a directed verdict, Eggett was entitled to present evidence about how and why Wasatch 
exercised its discretion in preparing the year-end financial statements: 
MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, this is my motion for a partial 
dispositive ruling at the conclusion of the evidence. The ruling I'm asking for 
with regard to the value of the shares and book value I think Mr. Eggett 
testified that he understood it to be a June 30 date that was intended and we 
agreed with that. We have an audited statement that has specific dates. The 
agreement requires that it be the audited statement from the auditors and the 
accrual [sic] and general [sic] accepted accounting practices and such. 
Therefore, we feel that this is the number that should be in here and that should 
not be left to the jury. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I've already indicted to you — well, first 
let me ask Mr. Love. Do you desire to respond on the record? 
Mr. Love? Do you desire to respond to that? 
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MR. LOVE: I would just rest on what I said earlier, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. The Court has already indicated to you that it's 
the Court's view that the generally accepted accounting principles may be 
affected by discretionary calls within the management or others in the 
corporation and thus I believe that the plaintiff should have the opportunity to 
present adjustments to that statement. He's not going to be specifically bound 
to the audited statement of June 30 or the unaudited statement of December, 
496, the June 30, '97, for the reason that after his termination by the 
corporation financial decisions that are discretionary may be made and the 
making of those discretionary decision[s] can affect his value should the 
corporation elect to make those decisions obviously inconsistent with his 
benefit. And, thus, he should be allowed to challenge that and show that 
reasonable adjustments should be made to the financial statements as then 
audited because of the, let's say, bias that had been incorporated by 
discretionary calls of the officers. Okay? 
MR. STEVENS: Thank You. 
THE COURT: Now, I hope I've made that clear. If there is any 
question about that, I think we've discussed that multiple times. It just seems 
to me that it would be inequitable to require him to simply accept an audited 
financial statement when that audited statement was prepared after the time 
that he had been terminated from the corporation and can be influenced by 
discretionary decisions made by the board or remaining officers. All right. 
Thank you. 
(Tr. 907-09) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Wasatch's assertion, App. Br. at 21, the trial Court did not admit the 
evidence on "supposed equitable principles," but as evidence of "bias" or bad faith. The 
evidence was properly admitted to prove a breach of the covenant, even if it was not 
admissible to vary the plain language of the Shareholders' Agreement. See, e.g., Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 (Utah 
App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) (evidence must be admitted if it is 
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admissible for one purpose, but not another); Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 
1983); Utah R. Evid. 105. 
Because Wasatch never mentions Eggett's breach of covenant claim, much less 
appeal the admission of the evidence on that claim, Wasatch's appeal is moot.4 
B. The Adjustments Were Properly Admitted to Prove That Wasatch Acted in 
Bad Faith, and to Prove Damages. 
Even if Wasatch had properly appealed admission of the adjustments to prove 
Eggett's breach of covenant claim, the appeal should be denied. The Utah Supreme Court 
and this Court have long held that each party to a contract covenants to perform its duties in 
good faith, and to do nothing to deprive the other party of the benefit of its bargain: 
In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not 
all, contractual relationships. . . . Under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or 
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to 
receive the fruits of the contract.... A violation of the covenant gives rise to 
a claim for breach of contract. . . . To comply with his obligation to perform 
a contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed 
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
If a contract gives a party discretion, that party must exercise its discretion in good 
faith. That party breaches the covenant if it exercises its discretion to deprive the other party 
of the benefit of its bargain. As this Court stated in Olympus Hills, supra, after a thorough 
4The appeal is moot even if, for the sake of argument, the trial Court admitted the 
evidence on "supposed equitable principles," because this Court will affirm the trial Court's 
decision on any proper ground, even if not considered by the trial Court. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1998). 
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review of Utah case law: 
Instances inevitably arise in which one party exercises discretion retained in a 
way that denies the other a reasonably expected benefit of the bargain. The law 
of good faith and fair dealing, though inexact, attempts a remedy for such 
abuse. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 385-86 (1980) ("The good faith 
performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise of discretion for any 
purpose-including ordinary business purposes-reasonably within the 
contemplation of the parties. A contract thus would be breached by a failure 
to perform in good faith if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the 
contemplated range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming 
a breach.") Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, comment a (1979) 
("[g]ood faith performance of enforcement of a contract emphasizes 
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party"). . . . [Cjourts have determined in a variety of 
contexts that a contracting party can exercise a retained contracting power in 
bad faith. 
889 P.2d at 450-451 (emphasis added; case citations omitted). See also, Cook v. Zions First 
Nat. Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996) 
("When one party to a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it must 
exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith"); Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706P.2d 1028,1037 (Utah 1985) (covenant forbids arbitrary 
action, and prohibits party from exercising express contractual right to terminate contract in 
bad faith); Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982) 
(corporation acted in bad faith in failing to approve prospective business partners without 
considering their merits, even though contract allowed corporation complete discretion in 
approving prospective partners). 
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Most important for Wasatch's appeal, parol evidence of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances can and must be admitted to prove a breach of the covenant, and the resulting 
injury and damage. In St. Benedict's, supra, the trial court did precisely what Wasatch 
requests here - apply the express terms of the contract and exclude parol evidence as to the 
conduct of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, stating unequivocally that an: 
examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine 
whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a 
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions and 
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract 
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties. 
St. Benedict's, supra, 811 P.2d at 200. 
A legion of Utah cases has cited St. Benedict's in admitting parol evidence at trial, or 
considering it on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. In Cook v. Zions First Nat. 
Bank, supra, this Court reversed summary judgment dismissing a breach of covenant claim, 
emphasizing: 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the parties constructively 
promised not to do anything to impair the other party's right to receive the 
fruits of the contract. Compliance with the covenant depends upon the 
justified expectations of the parties. As we have previously held, good faith 
and fair dealing are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a 
breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally inappropriate 
for decision as a matter of law. 
919 P.2d at 60-61 (emphasis added). 
In Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 1994), this Court refused to dismiss a 
breach of covenant claim, because "many of the key historical facts, and the inferences fairly 
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to be drawn therefrom, are in dispute." 871 P.2d at 565. This Court held: 
Determining whether a breach of the covenant has occurred requires a review 
of more than just the text of the contract itself.... This broad review required 
to determine whether a breach has occurred is generally one of fact, not law, 
and thus is ordinarily left to the jury or the finder of fact. 
A/., at 564-65. 
In Wester?! Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 
879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994), this Court denied summary judgment after considering parol 
evidence (including the affidavit of the opposing party), and stating that whether there has 
been a breach of the covenant is "generally a factual issue to be determined by [the fact 
finder] after consideration of all attendant circumstances and evidence" 860 P.2d at 380 
(emphasis added). Accord, PDQ Lube Center, Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 
1997); Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994); 
American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 273 (Utah App. 1988). 
As these cases make clear, evidence relating to the adjustments-those made by 
Wasatch and by Eggett-was properly admitted to prove Wasatch's bad faith. Eggett argued 
at trial that Wasatch made those adjustments to dramatically reduce the calculation of book 
value in the year-end audited financial statements. Management had no incentive to reduce 
book value other than to deny to Eggett the benefit of his bargain. Eggett testified about the 
adjustments for the suspense account, the Grynberg contract, and the swap contract, to prove 
the "true" book value of Wasatch if Wasatch had acted in good faith. (As a practical matter, 
only the adjustment for the suspense account is relevant, because that is the only adjustment 
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made by the jury.) The trial Court properly admitted this evidence to prove that Wasatch 
exercised its discretion in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
C. Wasatch's Authorities from Other Jurisdictions Are Fully Consistent with 
Utah Law Relating to the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Wasatch cites numerous authorities from other jurisdictions5 to the effect that parol 
evidence is inadmissible to vary the meaning of "book value" in shareholder buy-out 
agreements. App. Br. at 15-18. None of these authorities addresses Utah law relating to the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but all are consistent with it. 
In Crowder Const. Co. v. Kiser, 517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999), the court 
considered parol evidence in granting the corporation's motion for summary judgment. A 
shareholder contended that certain adjustments should have been made to the audited 
financial statements to determine book value for his buy-out agreement. To determine 
whether the parties intended to make such adjustments, the court "look[ed] to all 
circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement." 517 S.E.2d at 186. Based on the 
parol evidence, the court concluded that the parties did not intend book value to be adjusted 
as the shareholder claimed, had not made similar adjustments in earlier buy-outs of other 
employees, and had consistently calculated adjusted book value in the same manner for other 
management purposes. Id., at 187. 
5Wasatch also cites numerous Utah cases for the proposition that parol evidence is 
inadmissible to vary the plain language of a contract. (App. Br. at 13-15.) None of these 
cases addresses the meaning of "book value" in a shareholder buy-out agreement. 
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Crowder held that the shareholder presented no evidence to suggest that the method 
of calculation was intended to deprive the plaintiff of book value. The court distinguished 
Miller Machine Co, v. Miller, 293 S.E.2d 622 (N.C. App. 1982), in which the corporation 
allegedly concealed assets from its auditors to deprive the shareholder of book value: 
In Miller, plaintiff corporation sought to meet its burden through the affidavits 
of two certified public accountants (CPA's), whose credibility was not 
questioned. The CPAs relied on the most recent audit of the corporate 
financial statements in forming their opinion as to book value of the corporate 
shares. The defendant in Miller filed the affidavit of Rachel Hailey, a shipping 
clerk who was employed by the plaintiff corporation. Ms. Hailey averred in 
her affidavit that prior to the most recent audit of the company books, some 
$300,000.00 to 5400,000.00 of finished goods, as well as a large amount of 
other inventory, were concealed from the company auditors. This court 
indicated that the sworn statement of Ms. Hailey raised a question of fact about 
the accuracy of the audit upon which the company's book value was based, 
raising a genuine issue about "the correctness of the review and the book value 
of the stock." Here, [the shareholder] has offered no evidence which raises 
genuine issues of material fact about the calculation of adjusted book value on 
the date of his termination from plaintiff corporation. 
Id, at 185 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
Most important, the Crowder court held that the calculation of book value by an 
accounting firm 
in accordance with the terms of the 'buy-out' agreement. . . is presumptively 
correct, in the absence of mathematical error, evidence of fraud (such as 
willful concealment of assets) or evidence of a failure to follow generally 
accepted accounting practices. 
Id, at 189 (emphasis added). Here, of course, Eggett presented evidence that Wasatch 
manipulated its financial statements to deprive Eggett of book value. As Crowder holds, that 
evidence was admissible to rebut the presumption that audited book value was correct. 
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The court in Jones v. Harris, 388 P.2d 539 (Wash. 1964), also held that audited book 
value is not conclusive where it is determined "with an eye to the advantageous exercise of 
a buy-out agreement": 
"Book value" normally means the value of the corporation as shown on the 
books of account of that corporation, after subtracting liabilities. In such cases 
courts should accept the book accounts, when they are kept in accord with 
accepted accounting practice and not with an eye to the advantageous exercise 
of the "buy-out" option. If arbitrary valuations appear in the accounts, the 
court can then substitute amounts determined through correct accounting 
procedures. 
388 P.2d at 542 (emphasis added). 
In Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 541 P.2d 755 (Alas. 1975), the court rejected a 
corporation's attempt to rescind its buy-out of an employee's shares. The corporation 
claimed that there was a mutual mistake, because the parties intended "book value" to 
include an adjustment for a possible tax liability on certain deferred compensation. 541 P.2d 
at 761. At trial, the court admitted parol evidence in finding that the parties "were fully 
cognizant of the various factors making up the 'adjusted book value' of the corporate shares" 
as reflected on the financial statements. Id. at 763. The court emphasized that there was no 
"mistake of any kind" because the "parties had developed a method of computing book 
value which had been approved by the board of directors and which had been consistently 
utilized in the course of several prior stock transactions," even though it differed from 
generally accepted accounting principles. Id. at 763-64. Stentenfeld is fully consistent with 
the principle that parol evidence is admissible to prove that Wasatch acted in bad faith. 
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So is Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3301 (E. D. Pa. 1990). Swecker simply 
held that the term "book value" in a stock repurchase agreement was unambiguous, and 
refused to admit parol evidence that the parties intended book value to mean something else. 
See 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis, at 7. The court granted summary judgment, because the 
shareholder presented no evidence to prove that defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to 
enter the agreement. Id. at 9-10. 
Finally, in Sperco v. MS&D Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 973 (N.D. 111. 1989), the 
court held that a corporation did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
paying net book value pursuant to a shareholder buy-out agreement, rather than fair market 
value. The court distinguished the situation in which the corporation conceals actual book 
value, or in which the shareholder contests "specific aspects" of the book value calculation. 
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 3-4. Unlike the shareholder in Sperco, Eggett did not claim that 
Wasatch should have calculated fair market value instead of book value; rather, Eggett 
presented evidence Wasatch manipulated the calculation of book value in bad faith. 
Wasatch implicitly admits that evidence relating to the adjustments is admissible to 
prove fraud or mistake. Wasatch carefully states that Eggett's complaint "contained no 
allegation of error or fraud in the audited financial statement," and concludes that in 
the absence of any allegation of mathematical error, fraud, or departure from 
generally accepted accounting principles, the value determined by the 
independent accountants is "presumptively correct" and binding on the parties. 
App. Br. at 20, 21. 
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Of course, Wasatch ignores Eggett's breach of covenant claim. There is no 
meaningful distinction between fraud and bad faith; Wasatch cannot argue that evidence of 
the adjustments was admissible to prove that Wasatch defrauded Eggett or the auditor, but 
not admissible to prove that Wasatch manipulated book value "with an eye to the 
advantageous exercise of the 'buy-out' option." Jones v. Harris, supra, 388 P.2d at 542. 
Evidence of the adjustments was admissible pursuant to Wasatch's authorities, as well as the 
many authorities of the Supreme Court and this Court construing the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
This Court therefore should affirm the trial Court's admission of evidence relating to 
accounting adjustments made by Wasatch and by Eggett. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO 
CLARIFY THE JURY'S INTENTION AND VERDICT THAT $135,671.96 
WAS THE BOOK VALUE OF EGGETT'S SHARES, NOT THE BOOK 
VALUE OF WASATCH. 
A. The Trial Court Acted Properly and Discreetly, Well Within Its Discretion, 
and in Conformity with Utah Supreme Court Precedent. 
When the jury returned, the trial Court read the Special Verdict Form, and the jury's 
answer to each interrogatory, including Question No. 5: 
Question 5. On the date for evaluation of the shares you selected 
above, what was the book value of Wasatch Energy as defined by the 
shareholders agreement? That, the answer is $135,671.96. 
(Tr. 989.) Almost immediately, the trial Court asked the jury foreman if this verdict was the 
"value that the jury believes should be paid for the shares?" The jury foreman answered that 
it was book value to be "paid for the shares." (Tr. 990) (emphasis added). After an 
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objection by Wasatch's counsel, the trial Court asked the jury foreman the same question, 
and the jury foreman gave the same answer. After further objection, the trial Court polled 
the jurors to determine if each intended $135,671.96 to be the amount awarded to Eggett for 
his shares. Each juror answered unanimously and decisively that it was. The trial Court 
entered the verdict, finding that Question No. 5 
is ambiguous in its right [sic] and the way it was written and the jury was [sic] 
spoken that the value is due to Mr. Eggett is for the lost compensation, 
$11,888.00 and for his shares of stock, $135,671.96. 
(Tr. 993.) The trial Court then discharged the jury. Id. 
In clarifying the jury's intention and verdict, the trial court substantially followed a 
procedure approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1963). In Jorgensen, a personal injury action, the jury awarded plaintiff "odd 
amounts" in general and special damages. The "odd amounts" prompted the trial court 
to question the jury foreman about the possibility of a quotient or chance 
verdict. In connection with this questioning it came out that the jury had 
considered as one aspect of plaintiff s general damages, her travel expense 
from California to Utah. Defendant asserted this was a matter improper to 
consider, which was conceded by the plaintiff, and the court directed the jury 
to go out and reconsider its verdict. They did so and returned with a 
second verdict . . . . 
383 P.2d at 935 (emphasis added). 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's "prerogative" to question 
the jurors and direct them to redeliberate, pursuant to U. R. Civ. P. 47(r): 
Rule 47(r) U.R.C.P. provides that, "if the verdict . . . is informal or 
insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or 
the jury may be sent out again." In that sense the term "insufficient" means 
inadequate or lacking in some requirement, purpose or use. The general and 
well-established rule is that so long as the jury is functioning as such in the 
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course of the trial and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and 
instructions from the court to the end that the issues be fully tried, deliberated 
upon and a correct verdict rendered. And where it is apparent that there is 
some patent error in connection with the verdict, the court may of course call 
the matter to their attention and direct them to redeliberate. In that regard it 
has been held, sensibly and properly, that where an amount is erroneously 
included the court may direct the jury to retire and correct it. The trial court 
appears to have acted not only within its prerogative but properly and 
discreetly in handling the situation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Presumably, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court acted "within its 
prerogative," means that the trial court acted within its discretion, and that standard of review 
is abuse of discretion. The plain language of Rule 47(r) invests the trial court with 
substantial discretion to correct jury verdicts, and the Utah Supreme Court and this Court 
have committed related matters to the sound discretion of the trial court.6 
Consequently, this Court should affirm the trial Court's clarification of the jury 
verdict unless it was arbitrary and capricious, or with no reasonable basis. See, e.g., 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d937,938 (Utah 1993); Ute-CalLandDevp. Corp. 
v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Utah 1980) (affirming submission of additional 
6See, e.g, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construct., 977 P.2d 518, 
522 (Utah App. 1999)(whether to open judgment for additional evidence or for new trial); 
Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205,206 (Utah App. 1998) (whether to grant relief from judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 803-04 (Utah 1991) 
(whether to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59); Ute-Cal Land Devp. Corp. v. Sather, 605 
P.2d 1240, 1246 (Utah 1980) ("Rule 49(a) grants to the trial court discretion in considering 
issues raised by the pleadings but not addressed by the jury under a special verdict."); Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District v. Nelson 358 P.2d 81,84 (Utah 1960) ("entering judgment 
in accordance with the answers [to special interrogatories, but not the general verdict] is 
within the discretion of the trial court" pursuant to Rule 49). 
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interrogatories to clarify an ambiguity, because it "was not arbitrary or capricious"). For the 
reasons stated below, the trial Court acted properly and discretely, and well within its 
discretion, to obtain a correct verdict. 
B. The Court Did Not Coerce the Jury to Accept its "View" of the Evidence. 
Wasatch characterizes the trial Court's questioning of the jury as a "blatant attempt" 
to "control the verdict," and asserts that the trial Court "coerced the jury to accept and follow 
his view of the evidence, or at least created enough uncertainty to allow his own inference 
of jury intent to supplant the true verdict." App. Br. at 31 (emphasis in original). 
Wasatch's assertion is preposterous. There is no suggestion in the record that the trial 
Court had any bias or any "view" of the evidence. Any fair reading of the record shows that 
the trial Court was decidedly impartial and neutral in questioning the jury, and did nothing 
more than clarify the jury's intention and verdict. 
To manufacture a hint of bias, Wasatch quotes out of context the foreman's answer 
to the trial Court's initial question. Wasatch quotes the answer as "We believe that to be 
book value." Wasatch asserts that this answer "is consistent with the verdict answer" (i.e., 
that $135,671.96 is the book value of Wasatch, not Eggett's shares), and argues that the trial 
Court "should have dropped the inquiry" at this point. App. Br. at 29. 
Wasatch utterly ignores and does not bring to this Court's attention the rest of the 
foreman's initial answer, which squarely contradicts Wasatch's entire argument: 
Do I understand, Mr. Robertson, that the jury's decision, as I've read 
this question number five, is this the value that the jury believes should be paid 
for the shares? 
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MR. ROBERTSON: We believe that to be the book value. 
THE COURT: And so-
MR. ROBERTSON: Paid for the shares. 
THE COURT: So from the, I think the question was confusing and 
that's why I wanted to ask that question. . . . 
(Tr. 989-90) (emphasis added). 
In response to Wasatch's objection to the Court's authority to question the jurors, the 
trial Court said: "I'm not going to allow that to stand if it is a mistake. So if I can find that 
out now, I will find that out now." (Tr. at 990). The trial Court then asked the jury foreman 
the question a second time, and the jury foreman confirmed his earlier answer: 
What you're saying by that, let me just be sure that I understand what 
we're talking about. Is this the value that you think the corporation owes to 
Mr. Eggett to purchase his shares? 
MR. ROBERTSON: Yes. 
Id. 
Thus, the jury foreman told the trial Court that $ 13 5,671.96 was the amount to be paid 
for the shares before the trial Court stated that Question No. 5 was "confusing," before 
Wasatch's counsel objected, and before the trial Court stated that it would not allow the 
verdict answer to stand "if it is a mistake." The foreman's first answer destroys Wasatch's 
inherently implausible assertion, App. Br. at 30, that the foreman was improperly influenced 
by the trial Court's response to Wasatch's objection, and changed his answer to comply with 
the trial Court's view of the evidence. 
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In any event, Wasatch's assertion is inherently implausible even if the trial Court had 
responded to Wasatch's objection before the foreman answered. It defies common sense to 
believe that the foreman changed his answer in the moment after he heard the Court's 
response - that, but for the Court's response, he would have answered "no" to the question, 
"Is this the value [$135,671.96] that the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to purchase his 
shares?" The trial Court simply stated that it thought the "question was confusing," and 
invited the foreman to clarify the confusion, phrasing the problem in the subjunctive: "I'm 
not going to allow that to stand if it is a mistake. So, if I can find that out now, I will find 
that out now." Id. (emphasis added). 
Nor did the trial Court coerce the jurors to change their answers when it polled them, 
as Wasatch asserts. App. Br. at 31. Immediately following the foreman's second answer, 
the trial Court addressed the entire jury, again in the subjunctive: 
THE COURT: All right. Now I'm going to ask that question of all of 
you as jurors if you concur in that determination. 
Id. (emphasis added). Following Wasatch's sidebar objection, the trial Court began by 
telling the jurors that it "just want[ed]" to explain "the problem" to "get a clear understanding 
of what your decision is," and ended by asking the jurors to state "if any of you disagree": 
We know from the facts of this case that Mr. Eggett owns 36.5 percent 
[of Wasatch's shares]. If I interpret your answer to this question to be 
$135,000.00 for book value, [sic] That would mean that he would be entitled 
to 36.5 percent of $135,000. If I understand it the way I have now asked 
you the question, he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a number that you 
have come to by some calculation method for the purchase of his shares of 
stock. So, in other words, this figure, 135,000, is a representative figure due 
to him which represents 36 percent of x which is a larger number. All right? 
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Now, I want to be sure that I understand that correctly and if any of you 
disagree with that, I want to know that. 
First, Mrs. Hamilton, is that your verdict as I've just explained it? 
Id. at 991-92 (emphasis added). Mrs. Hamilton and every other juror responded, "yes". Id. 
Contrary to Wasatch's assertion that the polling question was misleading, compound, 
and confusing, App. Br. at 31, everyone in the courtroom clearly understood it and the jurors' 
answers. The trial Court was well within its discretion to summarize the two possible 
interpretations of the written answer. If the trial Court had simply repeated Question No, 5 
to the foreman or to the jury, as Wasatch asserts it should have done, App. Br. at 31, the 
Court would have faced the substantial risk that the jury would not recognize the problem 
and would perpetuate the mistake. 
When each juror answered "yes" to the question, "[i]s that your verdict as I've just 
explained it," each juror was answering "it the way [the trial Court has] now asked you the 
question." In other words, each juror was answering the same question that the trial Court 
had just asked the foreman twice, and which the trial Court had just told the jurors "[n]ow 
I'm going to ask that question of all of you." No one in the courtroom had any doubt about 
the jurors' answers. That is why the trial Court entered judgment in the amount of 
$135,671.96. Neither the jurors nor Wasatch's counsel suggested that the trial Court's 
question was confusing, or that the trial Court misunderstood the jurors' answers. If Wasatch 
really believed the polling question ambiguous or confusing, Wasatch had an opportunity and 
a duty to seek clarification before the jury was discharged. That Wasatch did not do so 
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waives its objection to the form of the questions asked by the trial Court. See, e.g., Bennion 
v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985) ("When special 
interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to object to the 
filing of the verdict or to move that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification" 
before the jury is discharged). 
In summary, nothing supports Wasatch's assertion that the trial court coerced the jury 
to change its "true verdict." The trial Court never suggested to the jury any view of the 
evidence, or that the verdict may be "irrational," or even that the verdict may be inconsistent 
with the evidence of book value presented by the parties. The trial Court never pressured the 
jurors to accept any view of the evidence. The trial Court simply asked questions, began 
each question with the subjunctive "if," and asked the jurors to tell the Court if they 
disagreed with the Court's summary of the foreman's prior answers. 
The trial Court's questioning was significantly less intrusive and more neutral than 
questioning upheld in similar contexts.7 Moreover, any conceivable risk the Court's inquiry 
coerced the jurors was ameliorated by MUJI Instruction No. 2.6, which informed the jurors 
in part that it "has never been" the trial Court's "intention to give any hint that you should 
return one verdict or another," that the Court does "not wish in any way to influence your 
7In Karl v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1989), the trial court 
sua sponte (and in the absence of counsel) addressed jurors "at some length concerning their 
answers to special interrogatories," concluded that the answers were inconsistent, and sent 
the jury out for further deliberation. The Court of Appeals found "no error in the district 
court's actions," noting that "all of the judge's communications were in open court and on 
the record, and such communications were not erroneous as a matter of law." 880 F.2d at 
70, 72. 
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verdict/' and that the jurors should "disregard anything" the Court "may have said or done 
if it made you think that [the Court] preferred one verdict over another." (Tr. 914.) 
C. The Trial Court Had Ample Authority under Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) to Clarify 
the Jury's Intention and Verdict. 
Wasatch argues that the trial Court lacked authority to clarify the jury's intention and 
verdict under Utah R.Civ. P. 47(r), which states: 
If a verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury 
under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
Wasatch argues that the trial Court did not determine that the written interrogatory answer 
was "informal or insufficient" under Rule 47(r), but determined that there was insufficient 
evidence to support it, which must be challenged by a motion for a new trial under Rule 
59(a). App. Br. at 25, 27. 
This argument rests on a complete distortion of what the trial Court actually did. The 
trial Court did not "substitute its judgment for that of the jury," App. Br. at 24-5, did not 
determine that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, App. Br. at 28, and made 
no additional finding of fact, much less a finding that contravened the jury's findings. Nor 
did the trial Court enter judgment nov or grant a new trial. Wasatch's many citations to the 
standard for setting aside a jury verdict under Rules 50 and 59 are irrelevant,8 and its 
%See Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (upholding court's 
discretion in granting a new trial); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983) 
(affirming denial of jnov and new trial motions); Ute-Cal Land Devp. Corp. v. Sather, 605 
P.2d 1240, 1248 (Utah 1980); Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass 'n, 470 P.2d (1970) (denial 
of new trial); First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Luhndahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) 
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invocation of the "inviolability" of a jury verdict is merely rhetorical. In fact, the trial Court 
preserved the inviolability of the jury verdict by clarifying it. 
As the record makes crystal clear, the trial Court found the interrogatory "confusing" 
(Tr. 990), "ambiguous" (Tr. 993), and thought the answer may have been a "mistake" (Tr. 
990.) The concern was whether the jury intended its answer to be the book value of Eggett's 
shares, or the book value of Wasatch; i.e., did the jury answer one question while the written 
interrogatory asked another? That concern goes to the form and sufficiency of the verdict, 
not the sufficiency of the supporting evidence. See, e.g.,Langton v. International Transport, 
Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1971) (because jury verdict "was defective in form in that 
it did not comprehend all the items of damage contained in the instructions given by the 
court, it was therefore insufficient"). 
As Wasatch admits, the plain language of Rule 47(r) authorizes the trial Court to 
advise the jury to correct an "informal," "insufficient," or "irregular" verdict. App. Br. at 27-
28. Wasatch attempts to circumvent this plain language by arguing that Rule 47(r) applies 
only to "patent" errors that are "obvious on the face of the verdict." App. Br. at 25. The 
assertion is a quibble. Once the jury foreman told the trial Court that $135,671.96 was the 
book value to be "paid for the shares," not the book value of Wasatch, the error was patent 
(trial judge made an additional finding of fact that was inherently inconsistent with the jury's 
findings); EFCO Distributing Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah 1966) (upholding 
denial of motions for jnov and new trial); Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1957) 
(affirming trial court's refusal to declare mistrial); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 
P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1999). 
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and obvious. 
Wasatch argues that the trial Court had "no right or justification to question the jury 
verdict," App. Br. at 24, but the Court was well within its discretion in doing so. Aside from 
the Court's finding that the interrogatory was confusing and ambiguous, the entire trial would 
have led the Court to ask whether the jury intended its verdict to be the book value of 
Eggett's shares. Both counsel in opening argument told the jury that it would be called upon 
to determine the book value of Eggett's shares.9 (Tr. 69,78, 81.) Eggett's damage evidence 
and testimony showed the jury how to calculate the book value of Eggett's shares from total 
stockholders' equity. (App. Br. Add. 53.) The other interrogatories all asked the jury to 
determine the amount to be awarded to Eggett or to Wasatch on its counterclaims. (App. Br. 
Add. 7-9.) The jury was not told or instructed that the Court would determine the book value 
of Eggett's shares once the jury determined the book value of Wasatch. 
Equally important, the trial Court was well within its discretion in noting that 
$135,671.96 would have been "irrationally selected" if it were the book value of Wasatch. 
(Tr. 995.) Wasatch presented evidence that Wasatch's book value was $75,452, based upon 
the audited financial statements. (Add. 63; Tr. 669.) Eggett presented evidence that total 
stockholders' equity, including the adjustments necessary to rectify Wasatch's bad faith, was 
9
 Wasatch's counsel told the jury that it would have to decide two issues: "One is 
what is he supposed to get for his stock. At the time he quit he owned 36.5% of the stock, 
a little more than a third of the company and there's a contract that talks about what he's 
supposed to get and you're going to have to decide the issues with regard to that." (Tr. 78) 
(emphasis added). 
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$699,778. (App. Br. Add. 53.) As Wasatch argues, App. Br. at 34, the jury was free to 
accept some of Eggett's adjustments but not others, and the jury clearly did so. An 
adjustment of $296,252 for the suspense items alone to the audited book value of $75,452 
makes the book value of Eggett's shares $135,671.96, or precisely the jury verdict C$75,452 
+ $296,252 x 36.5% = $135,671.96). Further, it must be emphasized and reemphasized that 
the trial Court did not rely on its belief that the interrogatory answer was "irrational" to set 
aside the jury verdict. The trial Court merely asked the jury foreman a question to confirm 
whether a possible mistake was an actual mistake, and then polled the jury. 
In effect, Wasatch seeks an interpretation of Rule 47(r) that would prohibit a trial 
Court from questioning jurors to determine whether a possible mistake was an actual 
mistake. No legal authority supports such an interpretation, and much authority opposes it. 
In Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 935, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's questioning the jury foreman "about the possibility of a quotient or chance verdict." 
See also, Poduska, v. Ward, 895 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1990) (court's questions to jurors and 
instructions to redeliberate "afforded the jury a timely opportunity to straighten out both 
apparent and possible mistakes") (emphasis added); Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 
F.2d 431, 443-44 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). 
Also in effect, Wasatch asks this Court to substitute its judgment for the trial Court's 
judgment about the "rationality"of the verdict or the "obviousness" of a possible mistake. 
The trial Court, however, 
[which] has observed the jury during the trial, prepared the questions and 
37 
explained them to the jury, is in the best position to determine whether the 
answers reflect confusion or uncertainty. The judge also is in an excellent 
position to evaluate whether the jury will likely be able to resolve this 
uncertainty with proper guidance. 
Karl v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 72-3 (8th Cir. 1989) (construing Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 49). 
Wasatch's attempt to distinguish the "patent" and "obvious" errors in the authorities 
it cites confirms that the trial Court here acted properly. In Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 
the jury's award included "odd amounts." The verdict was "regular on its face," and within 
the range presented by the parties. Nonetheless, the trial court questioned the jury about the 
odd amounts, determined that the jury had improperly awarded travel expenses, and directed 
the jury to reconsider its verdict. See 383 P.2d at 935. 
In Brown v. Johnson, 412 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the trial court instructed the jury that 
its award of special damages could not exceed $377.50. The jury awarded $10,000 in special 
damages, and $ 1,700 in general damages, or $ 11,700 total damages. The trial court told the 
jury that "there appears on the face of it an obvious error," and directed the jury to deliberate 
further. After a few moments, the jury returned with a corrected verdict, awarding $377.50 
in special damages and $11,322.50 in general damages, or the same $11,700 total damages. 
In affirming the verdict, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
error was undoubtedly induced by failure on the part of the jury to understand 
the difference between the terms "general damage" and "special damage." It 
is obvious that after deliberating on the evidence, the jury had arrived at a 
verdict of $11,700, and so the only amount of time which they would require 
to correct the verdict would be that which would enable them to adjust the 
figures between general and special damages. 
472 P.2d at 945-46. 
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In Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264,265-66 (Utah 1957), the Supreme Court approved the 
trial court's questioning the jurors to determine what they meant when they answered 
interrogatories by stating that they were "unable to say" whether a party was negligent. By 
asking questions, the trial court determined that the jurors intended their answer to mean that 
they were "unable to say" that a party was negligent, based on a preponderance of the 
evidence, not that the jurors were confused or deadlocked. The Supreme Court affirmed, 
noting that the trial 
court's questioning of the jury respecting their answers adroitly led them to the 
conclusion that they were not confused by the propositions, but were merely 
unconvinced by the evidence. 
We are unable to see from a reading of the record wherein defendant was 
prejudiced by the [interrogatory] questions; particularly is the fact emphasized 
by the examination of the jurors after their verdict had been returned. 
308 P.2d at 266. 
The ambiguity or error in the verdict here is no more or less "patent" or "obvious" 
than the errors in these decisions. Here, as in Brown, the error or ambiguity "was 
undoubtedly induced by the failure of the jury to understand" that it answered a different 
question than the interrogatory asked. Here, as in Jorgensen and Baker the trial court 
confirmed that a possible mistake was an actual mistake by questioning the jurors. 
These cases also squarely contradict Wasatch's argument, App. Br. at 29, that the trial 
Court should not have questioned the jury foreman or polled the jury, but was required to 
direct the jury to redeliberate. Moreover, the argument ignores the plain language of Rule 
47(r), which permits, but does not require, the jury to be sent out after it has been advised by 
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the trial court. Here, the jurors' unanimous and unequivocal answers made deliberation 
unnecessary. If any of the jurors had answered "no" to the trial Court's question, or said that 
he or she was confused, then further deliberation may have been warranted. Cf. U. R. Grim 
P. 16 (the jury in a criminal case may be polled, and "if there is no unanimous concurrence, 
the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations .. .") As it was, there was nothing 
to deliberate. 
Finally, Wasatch argues that the trial Court lacked authority to find the written 
interrogatory "ambiguous" because undersigned counsel did not object to it before the jury 
retired, or to the verdict before the jury was discharged. App. Br. at 32. The argument is a 
complete red herring. First, there can be no doubt that the trial court has authority to correct 
mistakes or to clarify ambiguous verdicts sua sponte, since it can direct a verdict or grant a 
new trial sua sponte. See, e.g., Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n., 470 P.2d 393, 396 
(Utah 1970) (directed verdict); Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984) (new trial). 
Indeed, the trial Court appears to have questioned the jury sua sponte in Jorgensen, Cook, 
and Brown, supra. 
Second, the trial Court can correct an ambiguity at any time before the jury is 
discharged, whether or not counsel has objected to the special verdict form before the jury 
retired. See, e.g., Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., supra, 701 P.2d at 1082 
("counsel has an obligation either to object to the filing of the verdict or to move that the 
cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification" before the jury is discharged): Jorgensen, 
supra, 383 P.2d at 935 ("so long as the jury is functioning as such in the course of the trial 
and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and instructions from the court to the end 
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that the issues be fully tried, deliberated upon and a correct verdict rendered") (emphasis 
added). 
Third, the absence of an objection is irrelevant, because Eggett is not appealing the 
jury verdict. Again, this Court can affirm on any ground available to the trial Court, even 
one not relied upon below, and Eggett can raise any ground for affirmance. See, e.g., Orton 
v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n., 470 P.2d 393, 
397 & n. 7 (Utah 1970). The trial Court's sua sponte clarification preserves the issue in the 
absence of an objection. 
D. Any Errors by the Trial Court in Clarifying the Jury Verdict Are Harmless. 
Any errors by the trial Court in questioning and polling the jury (as opposed to the 
authority of the Court to do so) are harmless, because the jury unquestionably intended 
$ 13 5,671.96 to be the amount awarded to Eggett. Again, the jury foreman twice told the trial 
Court that it was the amount to be "paid for the shares." The jury clearly calculated the book 
value of Eggett's shares, because $135,671.96 corresponds exactly to the audited book value 
of Wasatch, with an adjustment for the suspense account, multiplied by Eggett's ownership 
percentage. 
Significantly, Wasatch questioned the jurors after the jury was discharged, but 
presented no affidavits to the trial Court explaining that the jury intended a different verdict. 
See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, supra, All P.2d at 946 ("While jurors may not by affidavit or 
otherwise impeach their verdict, they may give proof to explain it.") Because there is no 
likelihood that the jury verdict would be different if the trial Court had asked a different 
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question, or directed the jury to redeliberate rather than poll them, any procedural error by 
the Court was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 395 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah Sup. Ct. May 
5,2000) ("A harmful error occurs when the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence 
or the error is sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict."); Baker v. 
Cook, supra, 370 P.2d at 266 (affirming trial court's questioning of the jury because "[w]e 
are unable to see from a reading of the record wherein defendant was prejudiced by the 
questions"). 
In summary, the trial Court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 47(r) to 
clarify a possible insufficient or informal verdict. Because the Court's timely action 
preserved the jury's intention and true verdict, the verdict should be upheld and Wasatch's 
appeal denied. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, 
In a Supplemental Judgment (App. Br. Add. 4-6), the trial Court awarded Eggett as 
the prevailing party $60,374.43 in costs and attorney's fees. The award was based on an 
attorney's fee provision in the Shareholders' Agreement (App. Br. Add. 29); Eggett's 
Employment Agreement had no attorney's fee provision. Wasatch seeks to vacate the award, 
arguing (i) that the trial Court made no findings, or "conclusory" findings, about the fees, and 
that (ii) Eggett made no attempt to segregate recoverable fees from non-recoverable fees -
i.e., fees incurred to prosecute his claim for book value of his shares under the Shareholders' 
Agreement from his claim for additional compensation under the Employment Agreement, 
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or from Wasatch's counterclaims. 
Wasatch's arguments are simply wrong. The trial Court did make findings: 
Based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, the Court finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett is entitled to an 
award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the amount of $60,374.43. 
The Court finds that these costs, expenses, and fees are reasonable. The Court 
also finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett has made a proper and reasonable 
segregation between those claims to which he is entitled to an award of costs, 
expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to such an 
award. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) the claims brought by Mr. Eggett 
to recover book value for his shares pursuant to his Shareholder Agreement 
were the predominant claims at trial; (2) the facts to be discovered and tried on 
Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement are so intertwined 
with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims and counterclaims 
that it is not possible to segregate or to distinguish them. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that it is proper and reasonable to segregate those costs, expenses, 
and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett before May 16, 1997, from those costs, 
expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett after May 16, 1997, when Mr. 
Eggett5s claims under the Shareholder Agreement arose. 
(Supplemental Judgment, App. Br. Add. 5-6.) 
Significantly, Wasatch approved the Court's findings as to form (App. Br. Add. 6). 
If Wasatch questioned the adequacy of the findings, it should have done so below. To hear 
Wasatch "complain now of the procedural deficiency smacks of invited error, which is 
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor." Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 
1107, 1116 (Utah App. 1999), quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 1994). 
"Because invited error precludes judicial review," this Court should "decline to address this 
argument further." Miller, supra, 983 P.2d atl 116. 
Should this Court consider the matter further, however, the trial Court's findings were 
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proper and within its discretion. The findings were based upon the Affidavit (App. Br. Add. 
80-88) and Reply Affidavit (App. Br. 89-95) of undersigned counsel, and oral argument, and 
well as the trial Court's inherent knowledge of the issues and proceedings. The initial 
Affidavit appended all billing statements and time entries. (R. 297-330.) 
Squarely contrary to Wasatch's assertion, App. Br. at 36, both the initial Affidavit and 
Reply Affidavit apportioned recoverable from non-recoverable fees. The initial Affidavit 
explained that Eggett retained undersigned counsel in late April 1997 to secure additional 
compensation to which Eggett was entitled pursuant to his Employment Agreement. The 
scope of the representation expanded when Wasatch terminated Eggett for cause and notified 
him shortly after May 16, 1997, that it would pay him par value, not book value, for his 
shares. From that point forward, Eggett asserted a claim for book value of his shares 
pursuant to the Shareholders' Agreement. (App. Br. Add. 82, Tflf 8-9.) 
The initial Affidavit segregated fees incurred before May 16, 1997, from those 
incurred afterward, because the earlier fees related solely to Eggett's claims for additional 
compensation pursuant to the Shareholders' Agreement. (Id., f 6.) The Reply Affidavit 
redacted certain fees incurred after May 16, 1997, that did not relate to Eggett's claim for 
breach of the Shareholders' Agreement. (App. Br. Add. 94-95, f 10). 
The Affidavits did not segregate fees further, because Eggett's claim for breach of the 
Shareholders' Agreement was inextricably intertwined with his claim for breach of the 
Employment Agreement, and with Wasatch's counterclaims. Eggett's claim for breach of 
the Shareholders' Agreement required Eggett to prove that his purported termination for 
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cause was wrongful and in bad faith, and a pretext to deny him book value for his shares. 
As a ground for termination, Wasatch asserted that Eggett took excessive compensation 
between 1995 and his resignation, and abused his expense account. (App. Br. Add. 33). To 
prove a breach of the Shareholders' Agreement, Eggett had to prove that he had not taken 
excessive compensation or abused his expense account. Accordingly, every fact relating to 
Eggett's compensation claim and Wasatch's counterclaim would have been litigated whether 
or not those claims had been filed, because Wasatch asserted them as a defense to Eggett's 
claim for book value. The various claims did not simply involved a common core of facts; 
the facts supporting one claim were asserted as a defense to the other. (App. Br. Add. 82-83, 
If 10; App. Br. Add. 90, ffl[ 3-5.) 
The trial Court acted well within its discretion in finding that (i) Eggett's claim for 
breach of the Shareholders' Agreement was the predominant claim at trial, and (ii) that the 
"facts to be discovered and tried on Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholders' 
Agreement are so intertwined with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims 
and counterclaims that it is not possible to segregate or to distinguish them." As this Court 
held in Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), cited by Wasatch: 
In Utah, the calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a 
clear abuse of discretion. In this case, the trial court denied the Harrigans' 
motion for attorney fees because only one of the Schafirs' claims stemmed 
from the contract and any "fees or costs uniquely applicable to the 
[contractual] warranty claim are insignificant." Although the trial court could 
have attempted to allocate a portion of the fees to the contractual warranty 
claim, it decided against such action because "it would not be appropriate." 
We believe that the trial court is in the best position to determine how much 
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of the attorney's time was spent on each of the four issues. In addition, we 
think that the trial court should determine whether an allocation of fees is 
appropriate under the circumstances. In this case, the trial court felt it was 
inappropriate and we defer to its decision because there is no clear abuse of 
discretion. 
879 P.2d at 1394 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
This Court repeatedly held that, where a prevailing party can recover legal fees on 
some claims but not others, the party can recover all fees if the claims involve a common 
core of facts. Most recently, this Court stated: 
Where a contract provides the right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed 
a party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the 
fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful. 
Furthermore, when a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a common core 
of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least some of its claims, 
it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably incurred in the 
litigation. 
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222,227 (Utah App. 1999) (emphasis added). 
This Court upheld an award in Dejavue, Inc., strikingly similar to the award here: 
In the present case, Dejavue successfully defended against U.S. Energy's 
breach of contract counterclaim. Accordingly, Dejavue is entitled to attorney 
fees under the sublease agreement. Furthermore, Dejavue's contract and tort 
claims were based on related legal theories involving a common core of facts. 
The trial court specifically found that the claims advanced by Dejavue, and 
interposed as defenses to the counterclaims, were based on inter-related legal 
theories and arose from a common core of facts.... Each of Dejavue's claims 
submitted to the jury was intertwined with its defense of the breach of contract 
. . .counterclaims and arose from a common core of facts. 
993 P.2d at 227 (emphasis added). 
In Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999), cert, denied 
994P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999), also cited by Wasatch, this Court summarized its prior decisions, 
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noting that 
We have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may 
not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of the 
compensable and non-compensable claims overlapped, 
and recognizing that: 
where the proof a compensable claim and an otherwise non-compensable 
claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party 
is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts. 
978 P2d at 483. Accord, First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah App. 
1996) (reversing trial court's award of fees to a contractor on a foreclosure claim but not on 
its defense to the homeowner's counterclaim, because the two were inextricably tied 
together); Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219,226 (Utah App. 1991) (noting that, although "the 
minute entry is somewhat sketchy," the trial court was satisfied that the prevailing party was 
entitled to all fees, and that because these complex issues were so intertwined, we find the 
court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees"). 
The trial Court's findings explained that Eggett's claim for breach of the Shareholder 
Agreement was the dominant claim at trial, and explained that an award of all fees after May 
16,1997, was appropriate because the claims and facts were intertwined. These findings are 
more than sufficient to support the allocation and award. The findings are more detailed that 
the "sketchy minute entry" affirmed in Sprouse, supra, or the conclusory statement that a 
segregation of fees "would not be appropriate," affirmed in Schafir, supra, or in any of the 
other cases cited by Wasatch. See, e.g., Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1116 
(Utah App. 1999) (trial Court failed to distinguish at all between recoverable and non-
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recoverable fees, or explain why an award of all fees was appropriate); Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266,268 (Utah 1982)(trial court made no findings to support an award, and 
the request for fees did not specify work performed, time expended, rates charged, or 
distinguish at all between recoverable and non-recoverable fees); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 317-18 (Utah 1998) (trial court awarded all fees without recognizing that the 
litigation involved several phases and several parties, and that the prevailing party failed to 
segregate fees incurred against other parties, or fees incurred before the defendant was joined 
in the lawsuit). 
Because the trial Court's fee award was proper, and within its discretion, and because 
its findings were more than adequate to explain the basis of the award, this Court should 
affirm the award and deny Wasatch's appeal. 
Finally, to the extent that Eggett prevails on this appeal, Eggett is entitled to an award 
of costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, supra, 961 P.2d 
at 319; (Utah 1998); Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., supra, 978 P.2d at 476. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum, this Court should affirm the trial Court 
rulings and the jury verdict. Specifically, this Court should hold that the trial Court properly 
admitted evidence of accounting adjustments on Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. This Court should also hold that the trial Court properly 
exercised its discretion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) in clarifying the jury's intention and 
verdict that $ 135,671.96 was the book value of Eggett's shares and the amount to be awarded 
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to Eggett. This Court should also hold that the trial Court properly exercised its discretion 
in awarding Eggett $60,374.43 in costs and attorney's fees as the prevailing party. 
Finally, this Court should award to Eggett his costs, expenses and attorney's fees 
incurred in this appeal, 
Respectfully submitted thistrL day of August, 2000. 
Perrin RZ L0ve 
Clyde, STOW, Sessions & Swenson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Roger K. Eggett, Jr. 
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